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Abstract 
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union with the EU. At least with respect to the trade in goods, Turkey is almost part of the Single 
Market. The challenge of enhancing the present state of trade integration could be approached in two 
ways. First, the customs union could be deepened by refining the arrangements and addressing its 
shortcomings. Secondly, the degree of trade integration could be enhanced by incorporating areas such 
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paper concludes that the Turkish-EU customs union has been a technical success overall and functioned 
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The Future of 
Turkish-EU Trade Relations 
Deepening vs Widening 
EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 5/August 2004 
Sinan Ülgen and Yiannis Zahariadis 
1. Introduction 
Owing to the EU-Turkish customs union, there is already a considerable degree of convergence 
between Turkey and the EU in the area of trade. In fact, Turkey is the only candidate country that has 
a customs union with the EU. Therefore at least with respect to trade in goods, Turkey is almost part 
of the Single Market. The future challenge in terms of enhancing the present state of trade integration 
is two-fold. First, the present customs union needs to be deepened by refining the arrangements and 
addressing its shortcomings. Second, the degree of trade integration can be widened by incorporating 
hitherto excluded areas such as services and agriculture in the customs union.  
2.  The customs union: Overview and assessment 
The EU-Turkish customs union came into effect on 31 December 1995. It represents the culmination 
of a long-standing relationship between the two parties and successfully solidifies 40 years of 
commercial association. This long historical relationship, combined with the unique status of a 
customs union between an existing regional trading block and an independent country, have 
contributed to the establishment of a successful, but also highly complex regional arrangement.  
The customs union agreement (hereafter also referred to as the ‘1995 agreement’) is not restricted to 
conventional border controls, but moves significantly beyond that by addressing areas of regulatory or 
deep integration. This depth of integration has been instrumental in both furthering the two parties’ 
commercial association and paving the way for full membership in the future. Yet the very structure of 
the arrangement also limits the realisation of the full benefits of integration between the EU and 
Turkey. Indeed, alongside its depth of coverage, the customs union agreement also includes a number 
of serious discontinuities in policy focus, partial policy treatment of potential problem areas and a 
continuation of various holes and loopholes in the parties’ bilateral commitments.  
More specifically, the EU-Turkish customs union required that apart from the bilateral liberalisation of 
industrial tariffs and the alignment of external industrial tariffs, Turkey was obliged adopt the 
Community legislation, with respect to the elimination of technical barriers to trade, the protection of 
competition and the administration of border procedures including rules of origin. Turkey was also 
required to adopt the Community’s commercial policy towards third countries, including establishing 
free trade areas with all the EU’s preferential partners, implementing various sectoral provisions (such 
as measures covering textiles and apparel) and ensuring compatibility with international agreements 
for the protection of intellectual property rights. This substantial alignment of regulatory regimes not 
only deepens integration between the EU and Turkey, but also strengthens potential gains. Against this 
depth of integration, however, the 1995 agreement also allows for the continuation of contingent 
protection (anti-dumping and countervailing duties) and safeguards – which is in marked contrast to 
the Europe Agreements where trade defence measures are eliminated. Further, it retains significant 
leeway for the continuation of various technical barriers to trade and continues to exclude agriculture. 
A more detailed presentation of the principal components of the customs union is given in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Policy components of the EU-Turkish customs union  
Measures dealing with traditional integration 
The EU and Turkey were required to eliminate all customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect on 
industrial imports between them, as well as the industrial component in the tariffs of processed agricultural 
imports. Further, Turkey was required to harmonise its external tariffs for industrial products towards countries 
that do not participate in the EU’s common external tariff (CET).  
Measures related to traditional integration having non-traditional implications 
Turkey was required to adopt all free trade agreements with the Community’s preferential partners by January 
2001. While these agreements are perfectly justifiable in achieving further alignment to the EU’s CET, they have 
also required a sophisticated system for their administration. In effect, Turkey has been required to adopt the 
EU’s customs provisions in the fields of origin of goods, customs valuation of goods, introduction of goods into 
the territory of the customs union, customs declaration, release of goods for free circulation, suspensive 
arrangements and movement of goods. Further, the 1995 agreement requires the elimination of all quantitative 
restrictions or measures having an equivalent effect in the bilateral trade for industrial products and the adoption 
by Turkey of the EU’s commercial policy with regard to common rules for imports and the administration of 
quantitative quotas. These measures have particular significance in the area of textiles and wearing apparel, 
where EU quotas against Turkish imports are to be eliminated and Turkey is to adopt the EU regime towards 
third countries.   
Measures dealing with deep integration 
Turkey was required to incorporate into its internal legislation all the Community instruments dealing with the 
removal of technical barriers to trade. It was further required that Turkey adopt EU rules concerning the 
protection of competition. These include measures dealing with pure competition disciplines as well as state aid 
to industry. A final, but less strict integration provision, required that Turkey ensure the adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights as specified under the agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).   
Measures dealing with exemptions and exclusions 
Despite the substantial liberalisation and harmonisation in the foregoing areas, the 1995 agreement also allows 
for a number of exemptions and exclusions in the commercial relations of the two parties. The first and obvious 
area is agriculture. The agreement makes no provisions regarding the Community’s common agricultural policy 
and excludes agricultural products from the arrangement. The second area concerns trade defence measures. 
Under the agreement both parties can initiate, investigate and impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties in 
cases where trade practices do not conform to the correct functioning of the customs union. The third and final 
area is safeguards. If serious disturbances occur in a sector of either of the two parties, then that party may take 
necessary protective measures. 
 
Despite its complex character, the EU-Turkish customs union has developed to represent the most 
concrete point of reference in the two parties’ commercial relations today. Indeed, the arrangement has 
managed to significantly enhance bilateral market access, progress the harmonisation of regulatory 
structures and set an institutional framework for cooperation. Most importantly, the customs union 
represents Turkey’s first step towards full integration into the EU Single Market. 
In terms of its economic impact, so far, the customs union has been positive. In understanding this, 
one has to keep in mind that the EU had already opened its markets for Turkish exports long before 
the customs union agreement was concluded.
1 That is why the customs union itself has not caused a 
major shift in relative trade shares between the two parties. The EU has been a key trading partner for 
Turkey ever since its inception in the late 1950s and the customs union agreement did not noticeably 
increase the share of Turkish exports going to the EU (Figure 1).  
                                                 
1 The EU had been gradually reducing industrial tariffs against Turkey throughout the 1970s and 1980s, so that 
by early 1990s tariff barriers only remained on a few sensitive products. THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 3 
 
Figure 1. The EU’s share in Turkey’s exports and imports 
 
Nevertheless, the volume of bilateral trade has considerably increased over the last decade, especially 
following the completion of the customs union. As illustrated in Figure 2, bilateral trade has grown 
dramatically since the 1990s, with both exports and imports more than doubling over the last ten years. 
That is what one would expect given the fact that the main effect of the customs union was to force 
Turkey to further liberalise its foreign trade (Turkey’s external rate of protection had been much 
higher than that of the EU (as embodied in the CET).  
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(a so-called ‘trade diversion’). It is the relative weight of these two effects that will determine the 
overall impact of the customs union. 
The data available for the EU-Turkish case generally suggest that there has been considerable trade 
creation, but little trade diversion. As shown above, the strong increase in bilateral trade relations has 
not been at the expense of trade with the rest of the world since the EU’s share of Turkish exports has 
remained roughly constant. Stronger bilateral trade has thus been accompanied by stronger trade 
growth overall (for Turkey). This combination translates into important welfare gains for Turkey.  
It is estimated that the bilateral liberalisation of industrial tariffs alone has benefited Turkey at around 
1% of GDP.
2 Further liberalisation towards third countries and adoption of free trade areas has also led 
to important gains. Estimates suggest that harmonisation with the EU’s common external tariff has led 
to an additional 0.5-1% of GDP.
3 Most importantly, deep integration measures such as harmonisation 
with EU technical regulations have further enhanced market access. Estimates of the gains are not as 
strong as those obtained through traditional integration, but it is suggested that Turkey has gained 
around 0.5% of GDP from harmonisation with EU technical regulations.
4 These are important gains 
and should be strongly emphasised. Nevertheless, as already argued, the realisation of full potential is 
still limited. More specifically, contingent protection continues to represent a serious barrier in 
bilateral market access. Estimates suggest that the continuation of EU anti-dumping duties have led to 
welfare losses of up to $70 million for Turkey.
5 These are non-negligible losses. Equally, in the area of 
technical barriers to trade, Turkish exports produced under European specifications continue to be 
restricted owing to the EU’s lack of recognition of certain Turkish certification procedures. If 
Turkey’s certification procedures were to be recognised by the EU, then the gains from the abolition 
of technical barriers in this area could reach up to 0.8-1% of GDP.
6  
Table 1 recapitulates and compares the EU’s share in the total exports of some accession and 
candidate countries for 2002. 
Table 1. EU’s share in total exports of accession and candidate countries 
  Destination country (€ million) 
Exports from  EU-15 World EU-15/World (%)
EU-15 1,577,005 2,582,331 61.07
Czech Republic  27,769 40,464 68.63
Hungary 27,091 36,042 75.16
Poland 29,954 43,552 68.78
Bulgaria 3,358 5,983 56.13
Romania 9,920 14,736 67.32
Turkey 19,191 37,253 51.51
Source: IMF DOT statistics (2002). 
As can be seen, the EU’s share in Turkey’s exports is slightly less than that of a number of other 
countries. But the difference is marginal and essentially the result of Turkey’s more diversified foreign 
markets. A similar picture prevails on the import side as well (Table 2). 
 
                                                 
2 See G. Harrison, T. Rutherford and D. Tarr (1996), The Economic Implications for Turkey of a Customs Union 
with the European Union, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1599, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Y. Zahariadis (2004), “The Economic Implications of Deep Integration in the EU-Turkey Customs Union”, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 5 
 
Table 2. The EU’s share in total imports of some accession and candidate countries 
  Source country (€ millions) 
Imports of  EU-15 World EU-15/World (%)
EU-15 1,446,411 2,467,251 58.62
Czech Republic  23,537 38,588 60.99
Estonia 3,338 6,230 53.58
Hungary 22,284 40,175 55.47
Latvia 2,273 4,294 52.94
Lithuania 3,326 7,817 42.55
Malta 2,969 5,328 55.72
Poland 36,134 58,516 61.75
Bulgaria 4,205 8,321 50.53
Romania 10,096 17,214 58.65
Turkey 24,572 54,001 45.50
Source: IMF DOT statistics (2003). 
Overall, therefore, we could argue that the customs union represents an important milestone in EU-
Turkish commercial relations, as well as an arrangement with significant potential for furthering 
integration. A number of areas contribute to this, including substantial overall liberalisation, the 
external liberalisation of tariff regimes and the significant alignment of regulatory structures (technical 
barriers to trade, competition policy, customs administration and intellectual property rights). The full 
realisation of the customs union’s integration potential, however, is still restricted by a number of 
remaining policy barriers: technical barriers to trade remain partially addressed; trade defence 
measures and safeguards also continue, along with barriers in external trade policy.  
The asymmetric nature of the integration between the two parties in turn creates the possibility for a 
substantial policy conflict. By going deeper in some areas, while restricting others, the EU and Turkey 
have faced and will continue to face harmonisation inconsistencies, which raise serious questions 
about the future of the arrangement. Our next section considers some of these areas and shows that 
despite inconsistencies, the dynamics of the EU-Turkish customs union point towards the direction of 
deepening integration.  
Before ending this section, we should also highlight the ever-present perception problem related to the 
customs union in Turkey. The customs union has become the rallying point for all the anti-EU and 
anti-globalisation campaigns in Turkey. The Turkish-EU trade deficit is depicted by mercantilist and 
populist circles as a net loss to the country. As a result, the public perception of the customs union is 
generally a negative one. It is seen as a price Turkey had to pay for enhancing its ties with the EU. A 
more concerted effort by government circles, the business community and civil society as a whole is 
definitely needed to improve the public image of the customs union. There are, we believe, lessons to 
be drawn from this experience as to the future of trade integration between the two sides. Additional 
steps must be accompanied by a pertinent communications campaign, which would aim at explaining 
to the public at large the reasons, the possible impact and the expected gains from this endeavour of 
economic integration. 
3.  Deepening the customs union 
3.1 External  trade  policy 
As described in more detail in the previous section, the customs union has been a catalyst in Turkey’s 
integration with the EU and more generally with the global economy. Our general evaluation of the 
Turkish-EU customs union is a positive one. It is believed to have been a welfare-enhancing form of 
trade integration dominated by trade creation. Yet the dynamic effects have proven to be more 
important than the purely static effects. In more concrete terms, the customs union has helped the 6 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
transformation of Turkish industry by introducing stronger competition and accentuating the need for 
gaining a competitive edge, which led to improvements in productivity. It has also assisted in the 
rationalisation of the industrial structure, whereby domestic industries sought ways to integrate with 
global webs of production and distribution. It has further contributed to the modernisation of Turkey’s 
economic legislation and therefore to its business environment. These are all factors that reveal the 
beneficial effects of the customs union.  
As to the drawbacks of the customs union, there are two major issues that came to the fore in 
the past. The first one relates to the inconsistencies between the trade policies of the two 
sides. As a result of the customs union, Turkey proceeded with the harmonisation of its 
commercial policy with that of the EU. That meant concluding a number of free trade 
agreements with the countries with which the EU had made similar agreements in the past. 
Table 3 shows the trade impact of these agreements. 
Table 3. Impact of free trade agreements on Turkey’s foreign trade ($ thousands) 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Import 1,287,220 1,169,225 926,179 1,155,270  1,480,928
Export 414,273 356,677 361,613 324,252  316,116
Total 1,701,493 1,525,902 1,287,792 1,479,522  1,797,044
EFTA 
Balance -872,947 -812,548 -564,566 -831,018  -1,164,812
Import 408,852 367,420 295,574 465,408  393,517
Export 175,887 213,316 233,606 252,934  299,415
Total 584,739 580,736 529,180 718,342  692,932
Bulgaria 
Balance -232,965 -154,104 -61,968 -212,474  -94,102
Import 394,087 344,672 401,157 673,928  481,139
Export 358,783 468,178 268,295 325,818  392,027
Total 752,870 812,851 669,452 999,746  873,166
Romania 
Balance -35,304 123,506 -132,862 -348,110  -89,112
Import 233,681 282,827 298,258 505,482  529,489
Export 391,514 479,507 585,239 650,142  805,218
Total 625,195 762,334 883,497 1,155,624  1,334,707
Israel 
Balance 157,833 196,679 2,863,981 144,660  275,729
Import 98,491 93,302 82,018 158,740  126,873
Export 82,896 69,557 67,257 101,571  109,399
Total 181,387 162,859 149,275 260,311  236,272
Czech Rep. 
Balance -15,595 -23,744 -14,761 -57,169  -17,474
Import 22,432 23,577 45,675 51,533  49,418
Export 25,157 18,056 16,986 20,199  27,565
Total 47,589 41,633 62,661 71,732  76,893
Slovakia 
Balance 2,724 -5,521 -28,689 -31,334  -21,853
Import 106,514 152,389 95,000 216,262  186,673
Export 133,966 113,684 121,919 109,994  170,230
Total 240,480 266,073 216,919 326,256  356,903
Hungary 
Balance 27,452 -38,705 26,919 -106,268  -16,443
Import 39,151 79,531 61,070 71,499  77,796
Export 55,591 34,675 25,764 23,953  32,586
Total 94,742 114,206 86,834 95,452  110,382
Lithuania 
Balance 16,440 -44,856 -35,306 -47,546  -45,210THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 7 
 
Import 30,958 10,258 4,748 7,091  1,336
Export 5,769 6,176 9,046 9,439  13,169
Total 36,727 16,434 13,794 16,530  14,505
Estonia 
Balance -25,189 -4,082 4,298 2,348  11,833
Import 1,625 2,618 1,659 11,949  151
Export 2,992 11,605 9,841 16,086  16,108
Total 4,618 14,223 11,500 28,035  16,259
Latvia 
Balance 1,367 8,987 8,182 4,137  15,957
Import 29,976 43,320 48,005 55,652  48,948
Export 34,291 39,016 36,681 47,581  62,667
Total 64,267 82,336 86,686 103,233  111,615
Slovenia 
Balance 4,315 -4,304 -9,324 -8,071  13,719
Import 91,954 82,052 81,245 164,681  168,070
Export 255,260 290,850 219,624 174,596  241,233
Total 347,214 372,902 300,869 339,277  409,303
Poland 
Balance 163,306 208,798 138,379 9,915  73,163
Import 30,217 13,237 7,878 10,470  9,116
Export 77,392 68,190 93,670 107,765  89,816
Total 107,609 81,427 101,548 118,235  98,932
Macedonia 
Balance 47,175 54,953 85,792 97,295  80,700
Import 8,579 14,757 7,893 25,375  17,330
Export 36,136 27,768 29,897 23,589  30,112
Total 44,715 42,525 37,790 48,964  47,442
Croatia 
Balance 27,557 13,011 22,004 -1,786  12,782
Import 1,295 5,298 16,222 7,497  4,927
Export 31,871 38,077 39,892 26,871  27,585
Total 33,166 43,375 56,114 34,368  32,512
Bosna-
Herz. 
Balance 30,576 32,779 23,670 19,374  22,658
Import 2,785,033 2,684,484 2,372,581 3,580,837  3,575,711
Export 2,081,778 2,235,332 2,121,330 2,214,790  2,633,246
Total 4,866,811 4,919,816 4,493,911 5,795,627  6,208,957
Total FTAs 
Balance -703,255 -449,152 -251,251 -1,366,047  -942,465
Import 48,558,721 45,921,392 40,671,272 54,502,821  41,399,083
Export 26,261,072 26,973,952 26,587,225 27,774,906  31,334,216
Total 74,819,793 72,895,344 67,258,497 82,277,727  72,733,299
World 
Balance -22,297,649 -18,947,440 -14,084,047 -26,727,915  -10,064,867
Source: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. 
It can be seen from this table that these preferential agreements contributed to a growth in Turkey’s 
trade volume. The growth in trade with these countries has been higher than Turkey’s growth in its 
trade with the rest of the world. As a result, the share of these countries in Turkey’s trade has been on 
the increase. Whereas these countries’ share in Turkey’s total imports was 7.9% in 1997, it increased 
to 8.4% in 2001. Similarly their share in Turkey’s exports, which stood at 5.7% in 1997, increased to 
8.6% in 2001. The share of these countries in Turkey’s trade deficit went up from 3% in 1997 to 9% in 
2001. 
In contrast with these developments, even after the completion of the customs union (which by 
definition requires a common commercial policy), changes in commercial policies were carried out 8 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
without proper cooperation or consultation between the parties. The most visible example is provided 
by the series of free trade agreements concluded by the EU after 1996. The EU went ahead and 
concluded these agreements without actually taking into consideration the existence of a customs 
union arrangement with Turkey. As such, there were no prior consultations with Turkey and therefore 
Turkish concerns did not come into play during these negotiations. Yet because of the customs union 
arrangement, Turkey was forced to conclude a similar agreement with those countries after the EU 
did. The problem was that more often than not, those countries did not want to negotiate with Turkey 
for a simple reason. Their agreement with the EU allowed them to export tariff-free (although 
indirectly) to the Turkish market, as their goods would enter into free circulation within the 
Community and therefore within the Turkish-EU customs union. In return, they did not have to 
reciprocate because under the free trade agreement only goods originating from the EU member states 
would profit from the preferential arrangements. As a result, they could export to Turkey on a 
preferential basis but did not have to extend this preferential arrangement to Turkey. Furthermore, this 
asymmetric structure also put Turkish exporters at a disadvantageous position with regard to 
Community exporters in those third countries. In addition, Turkey has been at risk of losing potential 
tariff revenues since goods originating from these third countries might not have been exported to 
Turkey directly but re-exported from the Community so as to take advantage of the lack of import 
duties. Although there are no direct estimates of the welfare loss caused by this asymmetric 
arrangement, an evaluation can be made on the basis of the number and trade impact of the free trade 
agreements concluded by the Community with third countries since the establishment of the customs 
union in 1996. 
Table 4 shows that as of the end of 2002, the discrepancy between the EU’s and Turkey’s commercial 
policy resulted in a one-sided preferential trade volume of €86 billion between the EU and third 
countries. These countries were able to export €36 billion worth of goods to the EU on a preferential 
basis while the EU was able to export €50 billion worth of goods on a preferential basis to them.
7  
Table 4. Impact of free trade agreements between the EU and third countries (€ millions) 
   EU TRADE  
    1999 2000 2001 2002 
   FTA   Imports  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
Macedonia∗  01.06.01  593 1,173 747 1,326 646 1,184 557 1,021 
Croatia∗  01.01.02  1,914 4,023 2,215 4,631 2,500 5,492 2,459 6,497 
Cyprus  01.01.98 605  2,368 1,004 3,123  955  2,956  715  2,901 
Malta  01.01.71 851  2,078 1,035 2,787 1,171 2,501 1,120 2,695 
Tunisia  01.03.98  4,774 6,031 5,495 7,283 6,188 7,965 6,045 7,584 
Morocco  01.03.00  5,553 6,627 6,015 7,736 6,241 7,476 6,295 7,697 
Israel∗  01.06.00 7,648 12,866 9,957 15,846 9,568 14,449 8,547 13,455 
Jordan  01.05.02  169 1,244 180 1,622 151 1,830 295 1,960 
Mexico  01.07.00 4,695 10,422 7,042 14,042 7,382 15,034 6,222 15,060 
South Africa  01.01.00 10,700  9,731  14,475 11,715 16,018 12,480 15,635 12,453 
* These countries have an FTA with Turkey as well. 
Source: IMF DOT statistics (2002). 
There are, however, no simple solutions to this dilemma. Turkey cannot automatically be made a party 
to the free trade agreements that the Community has negotiated or will negotiate. There will have to be 
separate negotiations. Yet the Community can induce a trading partner to open and conduct these 
negotiations in good faith with Turkey as well. Indeed, the EU started to introduce a ‘Turkish clause’ 
                                                 
7 It should also be recalled that third-country preferences may have been gradually extended to the EU so that not 
all EU exports were able to take advantage of preferential treatment as of the end of 2002. THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 9 
 
in its new bilateral trade agreements in which it asks its trading partner to negotiate a similar 
agreement with Turkey.
8 A suggestion in that regard may be to invoke a new sort of conditionality, 
whereby the ratification of the free trade agreement between the EU and a third country could be made 
conditional to the conclusion of a free trade agreement with Turkey. A more procedural suggestion 
may be to arrange the negotiations so that any round of negotiations between the third country and the 
EU should be followed by a round of negotiations between Turkey and that third country. In short, we 
believe that a solution can be found to this problem, which prevents unnecessary friction between the 
customs union partners or a perceived trade diversion and export impediment for the Turkish side. 
To close this section, it has to be stated that an asymmetric customs union is an inherently difficult 
arrangement to sustain in view of the requirement of establishing and maintaining a common 
commercial policy between the partners. In this specific case, Turkey and the EU went ahead with the 
option of the customs union in contrast to the free-trade-agreement solution that was being 
implemented between the Community and the Central and Eastern European states, essentially 
because of a legacy issue. The Ankara Association Agreement (unlike the Europe Agreements) is 
based on a customs union. The parties’ contractual obligations stemming from the Ankara agreement 
included the establishment of a customs union. There was very little discussion during the customs 
union negotiations about whether to implement a free trade agreement as opposed to a customs union, 
since changing the specific model of trade integration would have had political ramifications as well. 
In addition, Turkey viewed the customs union as a more integrationist project, which would have 
paved the way towards full membership. By the same token, however, it should be underlined that the 
customs union regime will be sustainable in the longer term only if there is concrete progress towards 
Turkey’s full membership. The policy-dependency aspect of the customs union would otherwise 
create a political cost that would militate for a modification of the trade regime into a free trade area in 
the long run.  
3.2  Holes and loopholes in trade policy under the customs union  
Despite the substantial depth of integration envisaged under the EU-Turkish customs union, bilateral 
trade relations continue to be limited by various holes and loopholes in the 1995 agreement. As argued 
earlier in our discussion, the two most important areas in this context include the continuation of 
contingent protection and safeguards.  
Starting with contingent protection, under the 1995 agreement both parties retain the right to initiate, 
investigate and impose trade defence measures in cases of unfair practices in their bilateral trade. 
These measures include anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
9 Such measures will only be allowed 
to lapse if Turkey can convincingly demonstrate to the Community that all competition and anti-
subsidy disciplines as well as other areas of the acquis communautaire have been adopted and 
enforced in the Turkish economy. There exists, however, no specific timetable for their elimination 
and thus there is no explicit guarantee about their future in the context of the customs union.  
Over the past decade, the EU has made extensive use of trade defence measures against Turkey. Since 
1990 the Community has initiated 19 anti-dumping cases against Turkey (Table 5). Of these cases, six 
were terminated with no imposition of duties, two involved undertaking – whereby the Turkish firm 
agreed to raise prices to a minimum level – while the remaining imposed a definite duty on Turkish 
firms. In terms of sectors, cases appear to be concentrated in low-skill manufacturing, with textile and 
apparel industries leading. Other industries also targeted by anti-dumping duties include metals and 
                                                 
8 The first time this clause was invoked was in the draft free trade agreement with Vietnam. 
9 Anti-dumping measures consist of special import duties imposed on products when the price of imports is 
alleged to be below the price (or normal value) charged by the foreign firm in its domestic market. 
Countervailing measures involve special import duties imposed when subsidised exports in foreign countries 
result in a costly reallocation of resources in the importing country or when subsidised exporters are able to pre-
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metal products, while more recently there has been a case involving pharmaceuticals (paracetamol) 
and a case involving electronics (televisions).  
Table 5. Some examples of EU anti-dumping measures taken against Turkey 
Product Initiation  Status 
Hollow sections  2002  Provisional measures rejected 
Flat-rolled products of iron   2001  Terminated: No duty 
Welded tubes of iron & non-alloy steel  29/6/01  Imposed 
Paracetamol 13/5/2000  Terminated:  No  duty 
5/5/2000 Imposed 
Steel-stranded ropes and cables 
5/5/2000 Undertaking:  No  duty 
Televisions (colour)  15/7/ 2000  Ongoing Investigation 
Steel wire rod  22/5/1999  Terminated: No duty 
Cotton fabric (unbleached) 11/7/1997  Expired/No definite measure 
Unbleached cotton fabrics  21/2/1996  Terminated 
Polyester yarn (PTY)  4/1995  Expired 
Polyester yarn (POY)  3/1995  Expired 
Cotton fabric  20/1/1994  Terminated: No duty 
Cotton yarn  1994  Expired 
Bed linen   25/1/1994  Terminated: No duty 
Portland cement  22/4/1992  Terminated: No duty 
Semi-finished rod of alloy steel  9/4/1992  Expired 
Polyester yarn (manmade fibres)  3/10/1991  Expired 
Asbestos cement pipes  13/3/1990  Terminated due to undertaking 
Sources: EU Commission (2003), Annual Report to the European Parliament on the Community’s Anti-dumping Activities, 
Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Measures List (various issues); Official Journal of the European Communities, C&L 
Series (various issues). 
Given this extensive use of anti-dumping measures, the question arises as to whether the establishment 
of the customs union has had any visible impact on the pattern of cases. More specifically, has the 
elimination of conventional border controls increased pressures in the EU for more trade-defence 
measures against Turkey? With regard to the number of cases, it is very difficult to provide a 
conclusive answer on the issue. Chronologically, the EU’s anti-dumping measures against Turkish 
exporters appear to be evenly spread throughout the decade. There does not appear to be any major 
break from 1996 onwards that would allow us to suggest that there has been an increase in 
protectionist pressures in the Community. 
Turning next to the case of Turkey, it was only in 1989 that the government adopted a law on the 
prevention of unfair competition. Since then Turkish authorities have made extensive use of anti-
dumping measures. Around 29 cases were initiated over the past ten years, of which only two were 
terminated with no imposition of duty (Table 6). In terms of sectors, cases tend to be concentrated in 
textiles, chemicals and some light manufacturing. Regionally, cases have mainly arisen against Central 
and Eastern European countries as well as Asian countries. There have also been four anti-dumping 
cases initiated against EU member states.  
The foregoing cases clearly demonstrate that anti-dumping measures continue to play an important 
role in EU-Turkish trade relations. Since the establishment of the customs union, both parties have 
invoked the provision on trade defence measures, with the weight falling mainly on the EU’s side. 
While it has not been possible to argue whether such trade defence measures have gained prominence 
after the customs union, it would be wrong not to stress that their continuation has hindered market 
access in the EU-Turkish arrangement. Surely such barriers have predominantly affected Turkish 
exporters to the EU, but as our discussion has suggested, EU exporters have not remained unaffected.  THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 11 
 
Table 6. Some examples of Turkey’s anti-dumping measures taken against third countries 
Product Origin  Initiation  Status 
Woven fabrics: Stable fibres  China  n.a.  Imposed 
Fittings Brazil,  China  n.a  Imposed 
Polyester textured yarn India,  Korea n.a Imposed
Polyester synthetic staple fibres   Korea, Indonesia  n.a  Imposed 
Polyester flat yarns  Korea  n.a  Imposed 
Refillable pocket lighters  China  n.a  Imposed 
Polyester synthetic staple fibres   Belarus  n.a  Imposed 
Ball bearings   EU  29/6/1997  No duty 
Benzoic acid  Netherlands  5/12/1996  No duty 
Universal lathes  Bulgaria  26/1/1995  Expired 
Steel billets  Russia, Ukraine  9/2/1994  Imposed 
Polyvinyl chloride  Russia, Ukraine  28/1/1994  Expired 
Citric acid  China  4/6/1994  Expired 
Refillable pocket lighters  China  28/9/1994  Expired 
Low density polyethylene  Russia, Bulgaria  9/10/1993  Expired 
Polyester synthetic staple fibres   Russia, Belarus  30/7/1993  Expired 
Polyester synthetic staple fibres  Italy  9/7/1991  Expired 
Drawn or brown glass Bulgaria, Russia 1/10/1992 Expired 
Polyester synthetic staple fibres (processed)  Romania  20/5/1992  Expired 
Benzoic acid  Netherlands  14/8/1991  Expired 
Lead-acid elect. accumulators  Korea  22/5/1991  Expired 
Glassware Indonesia  6/6/1991  Expired 
Universal lathes  China  22/6/1991  Expired 
Articles of porcelain/china  China  3/4/1990  Expired 
Slide fasteners  Chinese Taipei  13/7/1990  Expired 
Roller chain  Chinese Taipei  21/3/1990  Expired 
Lathe chucks  Poland  21/3/1990  Expired 
Cast glass and rolled glass  Romania  21/3/1990  Expired 
Drawn or brown glass  Romania  21/3/1990  Expired 
Sources: WTO (1998) & Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. 
Given the above conclusions, it is finally important to ask whether there could be any possibility for 
the elimination of trade defence measures between the two parties in the future. Contingent protection 
arises in response to a variety of reasons, ranging from cross-border abuse of a dominant position – 
such as predatory pricing – to damaging foreign-industrial policy. Some of these areas could in 
principle be dealt with by competition policy. For example, cross-border predatory pricing 
(traditionally in the arena of anti-dumping) could be addressed by competition disciplines. Equally 
negative spillovers of national industrial policy, traditionally dealt with by countervailing measures, 
could also be addressed by strict disciplines on state aid. In effect, one could argue that in line with the 
1995 agreement, anti-dumping measures could lapse if Turkey can convincingly demonstrate to the 
Community that all competition and anti-subsidy disciplines have been implemented. There is, 
however, a further dimension to contingent protection where competition policy becomes irrelevant. 
This dimension involves the more protectionist aspects of anti-dumping. Specifically, it has been 
argued that governments use anti-dumping measures not merely to remedy predation by foreign firms, 
but particularly to protect domestic monopolists or cartels from fringe competition. In the context of 
the EU, Messerlin (1995) argues that the Commission has, in the past, used anti-dumping for the 
protection of European cartels against foreign competition. There are no such allegations in the 
context of EU-Turkish relations. Yet there have been cases where the allegedly dumping Turkish firm 12 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
has a negligible share of the EU market (below 5%), which would suggest that European complainants 
were not targeting predation, but rather protecting their dominant position in the market.
10 Therefore in 
this context, while harmonisation with the EU’s competition policy could deal with some aspects of 
contingent protection, it could never lead to their full abolition. Such elimination will be a matter of 
political choice, to be made later in the association, quite possibly with full accession. 
Turning next to the second major loophole in the EU-Turkish arrangement, our analysis considers the 
role of safeguards. According to the 1995 agreement the customs union will retain the modalities of 
the 1970 Additional Protocol, which states that “if serious disturbances occur in a sector of any of the 
parties [Turkey, the Community or individual member states], or prejudice its external financial 
stability, or if difficulties arise which adversely affect the economic situation in a region of any party, 
then that party may take the necessary protective measures”.
11 In the choice of measures, preference 
should be given to those that will least disturb the functioning of the customs union and should not 
exceed what is strictly necessary to remedy the difficulties that have arisen. If the targeted party finds 
that the measure creates an imbalance between the rights and obligations under the customs union 
agreement, then it may take rebalancing measures.  
It is clear from the above that safeguards can potentially have serious consequences on the depth of 
integration between the two parties. The mere existence of safeguard provisions can incite rent-
seeking activities from import-competing interests. Producers in the EU or Turkey could adapt their 
behaviour so as to increase the probability of satisfying the conditions necessary to obtain protection.
12 
One could go as far as to argue that with safeguard provisions in place, import-competing firms have 
an interest in taking advantage of possible protection possibilities. Equally, it is interesting that the 
agreement makes no explicit mention of the possible causes of disturbance, prejudice or difficulty that 
have given rise to the safeguard or protection measure. It is therefore open to the interpretation of the 
Association Council or the arbitration tribunal (or both) to determine whether the measure is 
necessary. Much depends on the neutrality of the Association Council and the transparency of 
procedures. Yet to date the minutes of the Association Council and its relevant sub-committees have 
been hidden from the public. It should be noted that so far, neither party in the EU-Turkish customs 
union has invoked the safeguard provision.  
The discussion above certainly underlines the importance of the dispute-settlement mechanism in the 
arrangement. In the context of the customs union, either of contracting parties (Turkey, the 
Community or individual member states) can submit to the Association Council any dispute relating to 
the application or interpretation of the agreement. The Council of Association may settle the dispute 
by decision, which will be binding for both parties. In the event that it fails to do so within six months, 
either party can refer the dispute to an arbitration tribunal. Thus, the binding powers of the mechanism 
could either lock significant liberalisation through its decisions or allow protectionist pressures to 
dominate.  
To conclude, with regard to anti-dumping measures, safeguards and dispute settlement in Turkish-EU 
trade relations, our analysis suggests the following policy recommendations for the two parties: 
•  In the area of anti-dumping, it appears that unless the two parties are willing to push for further 
market integration, contingent protection will remain. Even if competition policy is fully aligned 
and the Commission is convinced that Turkish measures and processes are fully compatible with 
the EU, there will still be scope for anti-dumping measures (outside the strict confines of predatory 
pricing). It is important that use of anti-dumping measures becomes completely separate from 
protectionist efforts, which in turn will pave the way for their abolition. 
                                                 
10 This argument has also been made by P. Messerlin (1995). Of particular interest is the case of unbleached 
cotton where the alleged initial share of the Turkish exporter was 5.3%. 
11 See Art. 60 of the Additional Protocol. 
12 See B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1993), “Holes and Loopholes in Integration Agreements: History and 
Prospects”, in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, 
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•  In the area of safeguards and dispute settlement, our analysis showed that the binding powers of 
the mechanism/process are such that significant liberalisation could be enforced in the future. This 
development, however, depends primarily on the transparency of the system. Only if processes 
and procedures are transparent will the system be geared towards further liberalisation and 
integration. 
3.3  Technical barriers to trade 
Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) have, as already argued, played a central role in the customs union, 
as they represent an important step forward in Turkey’s integration with the EU Single Market. 
Nevertheless, the actual incorporation of TBTs in the 1995 agreement has been characterised by 
serious asymmetries, which in turn allow significant leeway for the continuation of barriers. More 
specifically, the 1995 agreement focuses primarily on standardisation – the process by which product 
standards and regulations are developed and adopted. By contrast, the agreement adopts a relatively 
minimalist position in the area of conformity assessment – the process that certifies that a product 
conforms to the requirements set out by a given standard or regulation. This in turn means that Turkish 
goods produced under correct EU specifications can still face barriers upon export to the EU, since 
their certification is not recognised by the Community. The same of course is true for EU exports into 
Turkey, as Turkish authorities may not recognise procedures in the EU and require duplicative testing 
and inspection. In general, as Stephenson rightly argued, it is no good for producers to comply with a 
standard if they or the sellers cannot demonstrate this to the satisfaction of the purchaser; equally, it is 
useless to comply with a regulation if the authorities cannot be persuaded of this at a reasonable cost.
13 
Given this highly asymmetric approach to TBTs, progress in the area has been relatively mixed. In 
considering developments and prospects, our analysis focuses on three main areas: first, problems 
arising from the institutional setting in Turkey; second, progress and prospects in the area of 
standardisation; and third, progress and prospects in the area of conformity assessment.  
Starting with the institutional environment, the current system of standardisation and conformity 
assessment in Turkey includes several governmental and semi-governmental bodies with direct control 
over the creation and enforcement of standards. The centrepiece of the system is the Turkish Standards 
Institute (TSE)
14 with primary authority and responsibility for preparing and publishing Turkish 
standards for all types of materials, products and services. Although envisaged as a non-governmental 
organisation, the TSE remains a public institution under the heavy influence of the state. Around 10% 
of its revenue comes from the government, while the highest decision making authority – the General 
Assembly – is primarily composed of various ministry representatives.
15 Internationally, the TSE 
carries an active profile, with full or affiliate memberships in major organisations in the field.
16 In the 
area of conformity assessment, the Turkish system is characterised by various levels of authority. 
Testing and certification procedures on imported products are performed by different national bodies, 
including the TSE and relevant ministries.
17 In terms of enforcement, all imported products that are 
                                                 
13 See S. Stephenson (1997a), Conformity Assessment and Developing Countries, Policy Working Paper, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., May. 
14 The TSE was established in 1960 (by Law No.132). 
15 See the Statute for the Establishment of the Turkish Standards Institution (1960), No. 132, November. 
16 The TSE has full memberships in the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) and International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), as well as, affiliate memberships in the CEN and the European Committee 
for Electotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). According to the authorities, all standardisation work is carried 
out in parallel to ISO/IEC standards and in line with the TBT Agreement. Turkey is a full signatory of the WTO 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) agreement, while Turkish food norms are fully harmonised to the 
FAO Codex Alimentarius. 
17 The TSE undertakes the testing and certification of industrial products, the Ministry of Environment focuses 
on environment-related products, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture and 14 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
subject to mandatory standards must hold a Certificate of Conformity (TSE mark) and a Quality 
Conformance Certificate (TSEK), produced by the TSE prior to importation.
18 In obtaining the TSE 
and TSEK marks, exporters to Turkey have to go through a lengthy and costly procedure, which 
involves the adoption of an inspection or control certificate by the TSE. The authorities stress that 
although the procedure is obligatory only for mandatory standards, it is also highly recommended for 
the marketing of products subject to voluntary standards. Finally, in the area of accreditation, Turkey 
has only recently established an independent audit. The newly founded Turkish accreditation authority 
(TURKAK) is argued to be an independent legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy.
19 
This is a positive development and although it is relatively early to make any robust judgments on the 
functioning of TURKAK, the law still allows for substantial interference from the state.  
Thus it appears that the current institutional environment in Turkey allows for considerable room for 
the continuation of barriers between the two parties. Problems seem to arise from the relatively low 
levels of transparency and openness of the system. This is evident from the obligatory or near 
obligatory use of the TSE and TSEK marks. European officials claim that the number and nature of 
products subject to mandatory standards (and obliged to use Turkish marks) are above and beyond 
international standards. Notable examples include rigorous regulations on certain chemical and 
cosmetic goods such as detergents and soap, as well as certain foodstuffs and beverages such as lentils 
and alcohol.
20 Most hindering, however, is that with regard to products subject to voluntary standards 
the Turkish authorities also stress the highly recommended use of TSE marks. In effect, although not 
openly stated, the authorities imply that unmarked products will face marketing difficulties. Further, 
delays and unnecessary documentation continue to act as a serious technical barrier against foreign 
producers, placing them in a disadvantageous position in the Turkish market.  
Turning next to the area of standardisation, Turkey’s process of harmonisation with the EU system has 
concentrated on two principal domains. The first relates to the preparation and adoption of the 
necessary horizontal legislation and is primarily under the authority of the Undersecretariat of Foreign 
Trade. The second deals with the adoption of vertical  legislation (the EU acquis) relating to the 
removal of TBTs and has a much more detailed, sectoral coverage.  
Starting with the horizontal legislation, a major development in this area has been the adoption of the 
new framework law
21 in July 2001, designed to enhance transparency and efficiency in the 
implementation of the harmonised technical regulations. The draft framework law lays down the main 
principles for placing products on the market, and the obligations of producers and distributors. It also 
addresses market surveillance and the prohibition of products destined for the market. All regulations 
have recently been adopted and integrated in the Turkish internal legal infrastructure. Yet their 
enforcement and implementation is believed by Turkish authorities to face numerous difficulties. As 
stressed by the recent progress report of the EU-Turkey Internal Market Sub-committee, there is a 
substantial lack of information in the administration and documentation for market surveillance and 
other import controls.
22 As such, administrative delays, inconsistencies and other red-tape costs are 
likely to persist.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Rural Affairs undertake testing and certification of agricultural and processed agricultural products, and finally 
the Ministry of Health focuses on medical products, cosmetics and detergents. 
18 This procedure also holds for goods that are produced and are in free circulation in the EU, albeit it is argued 
that certificates are issued directly in this case, as long as the producer submits a technical file to the TSE prior to 
importation. 
19 See Turkish Prime Ministry (2001a), NPAA: National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, Ankara. 
20 See Turkish Standards Institute (2001), Standards Database (retrievable from http://www.tse.org.tr). 
21 See the draft law relating to the Preparation and Implementation of Technical Regulations on Products (2001), 
July. 
22 Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, General Directorate of Standardisation for Foreign Trade (2001), Progress 
Activities of the Harmonisation of the EU Technical Legislation in Turkey, Ankara, April. THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 15 
 
Turning to the adoption of vertical legislation, the customs union agreement requires Turkey to adopt 
all 319 EU Directives. The responsibilities for the harmonisation of the Turkish infrastructure with 
different directives have been delegated to the respective Turkish authorities and are currently being 
implemented. Table 7 documents progress in harmonisation.  
Table 7. Progress on the harmonisation of TBTs between EU and Turkey 
Sector Authority  responsible  Fully 
harmonised 
In progress or 
partially 
harmonised 
Total 
Motor vehicles  Ministry of Industry and Trade 26 39  65
Agricultural & forestry tractors  Ministry of Industry and Trade 9 14  23
Lifting & mechanical appliances   Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 5  5
Household appliances Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 3  3
Gas appliances Ministry of Industry and Trade 1 2  3
Household appliances Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 3  3
Construction plant & equipment Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 9  9
Other machines  Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 1  1
Pressure vessels   Ministry of Industry and Trade 5 1  6
Measuring instruments  Ministry of Industry and Trade 6 21  27
Electrical material  Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 8  8
Textiles Ministry of Industry and Trade 0 4  4
Foodstuffs Ministry of Agric. & Rural Affairs 26 39  65
Medicinal products Ministry of Health 5 13  18
Fertilizers Ministry of Agri. & Rural Affairs 0 7  7
Dangerous substances  Ministry of Environment 0 19 19
Cosmetics Ministry of Health 1 7  8
Environment protection Ministry of Environment 25  7
Info. tech. telecoms & data  Ministry of Transportation 13 1 14
General Provisions in TBTs  Undersecretary of Foreign Trade 1 8  9
Construction products Ministry of Public Works 0 3  3
Personal protective equipment Ministry of Labour & Social Sec. 1 0  1
Toys Ministry of Health 1 0  1
Machinery Ministry of Industry and Trade 1 0  1
Tobacco TEKEL 0 2  2
Energy Ministry of Energy 00  0
Spirit drinks  Ministry of Agri. & Rural Affairs 1 0  1
Cultural goods Ministry of Culture 1 0  1
Explosives for civil use  Ministry of Industry and Trade 1 0  1
Medical devices  Ministry of Health 1 0  1
Recreational craft  Undersec. of Maritime Affairs 1 0  1
Miscellaneous Ministry of Industry and Trade 1 1  2
Total   104 215  319
Total in percentages   32% 68%  100%
Source: Own calculations and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (2001). 
Of the total 319 Directives, around 32% are currently in full harmony, while the remaining 68% are 
either in progress or partially harmonised. Significant progress could be reported in motor vehicles, 
foodstuffs and particularly telecommunications sectors, given the bulk of regulations in these areas. 
Other areas with significant progress are pressure vessels, medical products and toys. Nevertheless, in 
the crucial areas of measuring instruments, medicinal and other chemical products (such as fertilizers 
and dangerous substances), progress appears to be rather slow with most directives still under or 
partial harmonisation.  
Turning finally to the area of conformity assessment, largely reflecting a minimalist approach to the 
1995 agreement, the two parties’ relationship here is still underdeveloped. Much remains to be done to 16 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
reduce barriers for Turkish exporters. Efforts should focus on strengthening the technical capacity of 
the Turkish system of certification and ‘institutionalising’ confidence and mutual trust between the 
two parties.  
More specifically, Turkey continues to lack the technical capacity and infrastructure to fully meet the 
needs of the testing and certification process. The most serious problems appear to be concentrated in 
the crucial areas of metrology and calibration, quality certification and laboratory testing. Such lack of 
infrastructure in turn translates into a lack of confidence in Turkish processes and procedures. In 
effect, the resulting burden for Turkish exporters has become significant, as they need to certify their 
products with foreign laboratories and institutes, which in turn means increased transport and other 
administrative costs. To overcome these difficulties, two major projects have been launched over the 
past few years. The first is an initiative supported by the World Bank, which aims among other things 
at strengthening the country’s technology and metrology infrastructure to serve a larger section of the 
industry as well as to become recognised by European institutions. The second and more recent one is 
a project financed by the EU MEDA programme, which aims at strengthening the country’s testing 
and certification infrastructure and establishing the necessary mechanisms for market surveillance.
23 
Although both of these projects have been described as touching the ‘tip of the iceberg’, they also 
represent significant developments towards bridging the technical gap and reducing the resulting trade 
barriers from the lack of infrastructure.  
Finally, the institutionalisation of confidence and mutual trust between the two parties can be a lengthy 
and costly process. No strategy is a panacea in this field, but we could identify three areas where 
future work could focus. The first regards broader cooperation in the field both at regional and 
international levels. Overall, in the realm of technical barriers to trade Turkish institutes and 
organisations have been working to build up a more active profile in recent years. Turkey has gained 
full membership in all the major international standardisation initiatives. The most important of these 
include the ISO, which works to promote standardisation among national standards bodies, the IEC, 
which focuses on standardisation in electro-technical products, the FAO, which focuses on standards 
in food and agricultural products, and of course the WTO TBT/SPS agreements, which focus on 
formalising the rules that govern the relationship between international standards and national 
regulations. Turkey is also actively pursuing memberships in the relevant European standardisation 
initiatives – focusing mainly on the CEN and CENELEC. This active profile in both international and 
European arenas suggests that Turkish standards and technical regulations are gradually being brought 
in line with relevant European and international ones. 
Nevertheless, the country’s participation in vital certification and accreditation initiatives at the 
European and international levels is still limited. Turkey’s non-participation in the European 
Organisation for Conformity Assessment is a clear example. Given the seriousness of potential 
barriers in these two areas, lack of progress in international and regional involvement and lack of 
recognition could put Turkey in a disadvantageous position relative to its trading partners. Further 
work is also needed with the development or upgrading of Turkey’s infrastructure to the levels of the 
EU. New laboratories will have to be established and existing ones restructured and upgraded to 
international standards. The efforts that have started in this field through the two previously mentioned 
projects are very important for building a reputation and promoting the development of equivalency. 
The second and most important area of work relates to policy initiatives. Unlike the case between the 
EU and Turkey, countries with established mutual trust in respective practices and procedures could 
negotiate and reach mutual recognition agreements, whereby confidence is imposed by law. In the EU-
Turkish case, where confidence is low, preliminary agreements should be reached with the aim of 
setting the procedure through which confidence can be developed. In effect, instead of leaving the 
responsibility of confidence-building to the marketplace alone, EU and Turkish authorities can 
enhance and speed up the process through formal agreements. Such is the case for the Protocols on 
                                                 
23 See the Delegation of the European Commission in Turkey (2001), EU Supports Turkey’s Exports and Quality 
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European Conformity Assessment (PECAs) currently in place between the EU and certain Central 
European countries.
24 PECAs focus on specific sectors where the acquis has been adopted and the 
necessary infrastructure exists, aiming at serving as a testing ground to enhance confidence and thus 
the recognition of respective practices. Their sectoral focus will allow the EU and Turkish authorities 
to identify in detail the principal problem areas for different products and if necessary, undertake 
action for their resolution. Most importantly however, the agreement will serve as a platform for 
greater information exchange and provide the necessary requirements for the gradual development of 
confidence, trust and indeed recognition. But it should be noted that the Commission does not have the 
power to initiate negotiations on PECAs with Turkey. Under the current agreement, only the Turkish 
authorities can initiate discussions and request further cooperation in conformity assessment. 
Finally, a word of warning is also needed with regard to the establishment of unions of importers in 
Turkey. Although the alleged claim is to be able to better monitor imports, these bodies are arguably 
in violation of Turkey’s commitments under the customs union decision. They may be interpreted as a 
measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and therefore are in violation of Art. 5 of 
the decision by virtue of introducing additional red tape in connection with imports. Their mandatory 
participation fees may also be interpreted as having an equivalent effect to customs duties. These 
features of the unions of importers will most likely give rise to a complaint from the EU side and may 
be seen as another element of Turkey’s disguised protectionism. 
To conclude, our analysis would suggest the following policy recommendations: 
•  Internally, greater emphasis should be placed on strengthening the transparency of the Turkish 
system of standardisation and conformity assessment. The adoption of the new framework law and 
the establishment of TURKAK are important developments in this respect.  
•  Greater effort should be placed in strengthening Turkey’s technical capacity and infrastructure in 
order to fully meet the needs of testing and certification processes. Particular attention should be 
given to critical areas of conformity assessment including metrology and calibration, quality 
certification and laboratory testing. 
•  Turkish institutes and organisations should energetically continue their efforts to promote a more 
active international profile. Alignment with and participation in European and international 
initiatives should continue in order to strengthen reputation-building and promote the recognition 
of equivalency. It is vital that efforts continue in the pursuit of memberships to the European CEN 
and CENELEC, but equal emphasis should be placed on the area of conformity assessment. 
•  Bilateral contractual initiatives in the form of PECAs should also be sought by Turkish authorities. 
Such arrangements can set the platform for enhancing confidence and thus recognising respective 
practices. 
3.4  Competition law and state aids 
The topic of competition policy entered Turkey’s agenda with the establishment of the customs union. 
As such, the application of competition rules in Turkey is a direct consequence of the country’s trade 
integration with the EU. The customs union decision stipulates that Turkey shall apply a substantially 
similar competition policy to that of the EU. In that regard, Law No. 4054 on the Protection of 
Competition incorporates a parallel wording of the Arts. 81 and 82 and the relevant sections of the 
EU’s merger regulation. In addition, the implementing legislation issued by the Turkish Competition 
Board (or in other words the block exemption regulations) are modelled after the block exemption 
regulations of the EU. In short, the legislative framework of the Turkish competition law is very 
similar to the EU’s. In terms of the approximation or harmonisation of legislation, competition rules 
stand out as a major success. 
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This success story is further strengthened by the performance of the Turkish Competition Authority. It 
can be claimed that the Turkish Competition Authority is among the best-performing regulatory 
institutions in Turkey. Although it was established relatively late (in 1997) – a full three years after the 
promulgation of the law on competition, it blossomed into a high quality, professional body whose 
performance has also been commended by the European Commission in its regular progress reports on 
Turkey. Finally, one of the major shortcomings of competition law in Turkey was addressed in 2003 
when an amendment to the law enabled the Competition Board to give teeth to its ability to impose 
fines on violating entities. Before the amendment, in case the decision of the board was appealed, the 
fines in question would not come into effect until the board’s decision was finally approved by the 
appellate body, namely the Higher Administrative Court.  
Against this generally positive backdrop, there are still areas of concern that relate to the future. 
The first one relates to the aim of competition policy. It is clear that one of the aims of competition 
policy in Europe is to support the objective of market integration. Competition policy is one of the 
regulatory tools used to further this objective. Therefore the outlook of the European Commission on 
competition cases is necessarily affected by this market-integration objective. The case law on 
competition in the EU reflects this concern. This is quite normal in view of the nature of the EU where 
a supranational structure tries to integrate what were hitherto national markets. It is worth recalling in 
this instance that the European competition law is a supranational law. With the customs union, 
Turkey took on the responsibility of applying a substantially similar competition law. The conceptual 
problem is that a set of rules designed for supranational integration is to be applied on a national scale. 
Although objectives such as promoting market integration or the prevention of market fragmentation 
are relevant at the supranational dimension, these are nonexistent at the national dimension. Optimally, 
the application of the law at a national level should have taken this difference in objectives into 
consideration. But the application of competition rules in Turkey since 1997 has demonstrated that this 
was not the approach adopted by the Turkish Competition Authority. The decisions of the Turkish 
Competition Authority were influenced too much by the relevant EU case law. As a result, on issues 
dealing with vertical restraints for instance, the interpretation of the Turkish Competition Authority 
turned out to be too restrictive and less beneficial for enhancing competition in the domestic market. 
While vertical restraints can become a priority issue in dealing with supranational market integration, 
it is much less relevant for a market that is already integrated. Therefore in the future, the Turkish 
Competition Authority should enforce competition rules in a manner that considers the difference in 
aims between EU competition law and Turkish competition law. Such consideration would mean a 
justifiably differentiated approach to competition cases where to date a blind commitment to EU case 
law has been the standard. It is worth recalling that until a few years ago, the UK’s national 
competition legislation was very different from the EU’s competition legislation. 
Although in some cases a subtly different approach to protecting competition is needed in Turkey, in 
other areas the exact opposite is true. The two most relevant topics in this respect are the enhancement 
of the culture of competition and the implementation of leniency rules and de minimis rules.  
Standing in stark contrast to its performance on competition cases is the statutory role of the Turkish 
Competition Authority in developing the culture of competition. This has been the most visible area of 
underperformance of the Authority. The Authority has been unable to fulfil its role in educating public 
opinion about the value and role of competition policy. According to Ismen,
25 “the Competition Board 
is much more focused on and concerned with business centres, its main foes, than it is with its main 
clients, consumers and the small and medium-sized enterprises”. Ismen claims that this choice is both 
expected and understandable in light of Turkey’s political and social environment where there are no 
serious consumer groups. That is nonetheless an area where the Authority should follow EU practice 
more closely. It may therefore be important to launch a cooperation programme between the European 
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Commission, some national competition authorities and the Turkish Competition Authority on 
successful awareness-raising campaigns for competition rules.  
There are also areas where the harmonisation of legislation is not complete and as a result the 
application of competition rules is made more difficult and uncertain. The first one of these areas 
concerns leniency rules. Leniency rules are designed to give incentives to participants in cartel 
arrangements to blow the whistle on the cartel. Although the European Commission makes use of 
these rules and furthermore underlines
26 the importance of the rules in discovering cartel cases, Turkey 
does not yet have such rules. As a result, the efforts of the Turkish Competition Board towards 
targeting collusion and cartel-like arrangements are seriously undermined. The institution is thus 
forced to spend its time in examining the notification files for individual exemptions, merger 
notifications and investigating the odd case of alleged anti-competitive behaviour. There is also a 
serious need in Turkey to divert the efforts of the competition authorities towards the economically 
more important and more damaging cases of anti-competitive behaviour as there is in the EU. 
Leniency rules are an indispensable element in this regard. The Turkish Competition Authority should 
be called upon to adopt these rules as soon as possible. 
A similar situation prevails as regards de minimis rules. De minimis rules in competition law are used 
to weed out economically insignificant cases of anti-competitive behaviour. The Competition 
Authority can therefore concentrate its resources on other more meaningful cases. The EU’s practice 
in this area is well-developed, unlike Turkey where there are no de minimis rules. As a result, the 
Competition Authority is actually forced to investigate even very minor instances of anti-competitive 
practices, which leads to a severe misallocation of resources. Therefore the harmonisation of Turkey’s 
competition legislation with that of the EU should proceed so as to include de minimis rules.  
Concerning the question of harmonisation, a more important issue is the maintenance of harmonised 
legislation. The customs union does not only oblige Turkey to harmonise its competition law with that 
of the EU but it also commits Turkey to follow the changes in competition law adopted by the EU. 
This policy dependence is at the root nowadays of a significant challenge for Turkey. The EU is in the 
process of implementing a radical reform of its competition rules. The new rules are set to decentralise 
decision-making in competition policy. They foresee a more active involvement of national courts in 
competition cases. They also introduce a more flexible enforcement regime characterised by the 
abolition of the authorisation system requiring the notification of restrictive agreements to the 
Commission for clearance. The establishment of a European competition network (ECN) composed of 
the Commission and the national competition authorities is also foreseen.  
The flexibility and decentralisation introduced by the enforcement of competition rules at the 
European level came about as the policy-makers were convinced that after 40 years of application, the 
European business community had developed an understanding of and knowledge about competition 
rules. In other words, the culture of competition was well entrenched in Europe. Therefore a switch 
towards a more flexible regime of enforcement where national authorities and national courts would 
have an increased role was possible. The radical transformation of the enforcement regime hinged on 
the understanding that the public awareness of competition rules was sufficient in Europe.  
The situation in Turkey is vastly different, but because of the relevant provisions of the customs union 
decision, Turkey is nonetheless bound to follow the EU in transforming its own enforcement policy. 
The mandatory notification procedure that had been applied in the EU for more than 40 years and now 
for almost seven years in Turkey has to be considered as an indispensable element in the spread of the 
competition culture. The lifting of this obligation at a time when awareness about competition issues is 
still low is tantamount to severely restricting the effectiveness of competition rules. From the Turkish 
standpoint, it would make no sense to follow the EU at this point in time. There is still a lot of distance 
to cover in terms of spreading the competition culture in Turkey. Thus there may be a need to agree on 
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a longer transition period than the one foreseen by the customs union decision for Turkey’s adoption 
of the new rules introduced by the EU.  
Finally, the question of state aid needs to be addressed at this point. Although also foreseen by the 
customs union decision, Turkey has refrained so far from establishing an independent authority to 
monitor state aid at the domestic level. This deficiency has been highlighted in successive regular 
reports by the Commission. There is now a draft law before parliament that calls for the establishment 
of a state aids monitoring authority. The current draft law has several drawbacks though. First, the 
regulatory body in question shall not be independent for instance. It is to be headed by the 
Undersecretariat of the State Planning Organisation and include representatives from other 
governmental and quasi-governmental bodies such as the Treasury, the Ministry of Industry and the 
Competition Authority. Second, it is drafted in such a way that it sheds doubt on how well the concept 
of state aid is understood in practice. It should actually be considered as a relic of the past where the 
concept of state aid was essentially limited to government incentive schemes. Furthermore, it seems to 
leave services of general interest out of its scope. Therefore it is essential that the current draft law be 
amended in order to bring about a framework law for the monitoring of state aid that would be more 
effective and also compatible with EU practice.  
The independent enforcement of state-aid control is important not only on account of fulfilling 
Turkey’s obligations stemming from the customs union but also in order to succeed in the game of 
liberalising and de-regulating hitherto state-owned or dominated domains of activity in utilities such as 
telecommunications, energy, postal services or even banking. The application of state-aid rules will 
also contribute positively to Turkey’s image vis-à-vis international investors. The state’s potential for 
unfair competition is a significant impediment to foreign investment.  
To conclude, the recommendations in relation to the topic of competition policy can be summarised as 
follows: 
•  Awareness should be raised of the need for a slightly differentiated approach between the 
European Commission and the Turkish Competition Authority in relation to alleged anti-
competitive behaviours and especially in connection with vertical restraints resulting from the 
difference in aims between European competition policy applied at the supranational level and 
Turkish competition policy applied at the national level. 
•  Institutional support by the European Commission or national competition authorities (or both) is 
needed to enable the Turkish Competition Authority to be more effective in its role of promoting 
the culture of competition. 
•  The harmonisation of legislation in relation to leniency rules and de minimis rules should be 
accelerated. 
•  A five- to ten-year transition period should be granted to Turkey for the adoption of the new 
competition rules introduced as of the 1
st of May 2004 in the EU. 
•  The draft framework law on the monitoring of state aid should be amended to achieve a more 
effective regime for state-aid control in a manner that is compatible with EU practice. 
3.5  Intellectual property rights 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) also represent an important area of deep integration in the context of 
the EU-Turkish customs union. Nevertheless, the approach adopted by the two parties for IPRs could 
be described as somewhat less aggressive, involving less harmonisation/approximation of respective 
rules and focusing more on mutual compatibility with international regulations. Indeed, the 1995 
agreement requires the EU and Turkey to re-confirm the importance they attach to the obligations 
arising from the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) concluded 
in the Uruguay round of multilateral free trade negotiations. In this context, Turkey was required to: 
adopt and implement no later than 1999 the provisions of the WTO TRIPs agreement; accede by 1996 THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 21 
 
to the Paris Act, Rome Convention, Stockholm Act and the Nice agreement;
27 and adopt by 1996 
domestic legislation on the protection of IPRs that is compatible with EU directives. 
Turkey has made considerable progress in the area of IPRs. The Turkish Patent Institute has 
administrative and financial autonomy and has full responsibility for the registration and 
administration of patents and IPRs (trademarks, industrial designs and destination of origin). On the 
legislative side, a first important step has been the adoption of detailed legislation aiming at 
strengthening alignment with EU directives on rental rights and lending, copyrights and the provisions 
of the Rome and Bern Conventions, TRIPs and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
‘Internet’ Treaties.
28 Furthermore, in November 2000 Turkey ratified and acceded to the European 
Patent Convention.
29 Moreover, in the area of protection and supervision, in 2001, Turkey adopted 
new legislation identifying the division of legislative powers between the general civil and penal 
courts and new specialised courts that are handling cases related to IPRs. 
Given the above developments a number of commentators now describe Turkey as an attractive 
investment environment, which is in compliance with the TRIPs and the WTO.
30 This qualification is 
an important step forward for Turkey that should be emphasised. IPRs essentially set a rules-based 
system for the marketing and trade of innovative new ideas and thus act as a powerful signalling 
mechanism for potential foreign investors. By acquiring a sound set of IPR rules and a transparent and 
reliable monitoring system, Turkey creates better opportunities for strengthening foreign investment 
flows and in particular foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Table 8. Estimated trade losses owing to piracy and levels of piracy  
 2003  2002  2001 
Industry  Loss 
($ mil.) 
Level 
(%) 
Loss 
($ mil.) 
Level 
(%) 
Loss 
($ mil.) 
Level 
(%) 
Motion  pictures  50 45 50 45 50 40 
Music  15 75 18 75 3.5  35 
Business software  n.a.  n.a.  38  58  22.4  58 
Entertainment  software  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.7  90 
Books  25  25  n.a. n.a. 27  n.a. 
Total  n.a.  - 131.5  - 126.6  - 
Source:  International Intellectual Property Alliance (2004), 2004 Special 301 Report, Turkey, IIPA, Washington, D.C. 
(retrievable from http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2004/2004SPEC301TURKEY.pdf). 
Despite these positive steps, however, much remains to be done to promote compatibility and 
integration with the EU system. Piracy and counterfeit remain serious problems in the country. See 
Table 8. The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates that in 2002, the total trade loss due 
to piracy reached $131.5 million with counterfeit levels as high as 58% and 75% in the music and 
business software industries respectively. Even if these estimates are to be taken ‘with a grain of salt’, 
they do indicate an alarming environment that should be addressed by the authorities. One positive 
development has been the establishment of provincial enforcement committees in 2002, but 
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protects performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations, the Stockholm Act (1967) of the 
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28 See the European Commission (2002), Regular Progress Report on Turkey, Brussels. 
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Property as a Requirement of Membership”, in Peter G. Xuereb (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Integration: The 
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administrative capacity should be strengthened with “training and more inter-institutional cooperation 
between the police, customs offices and the judiciary”.
31  
On the legislative side, the Commission remains critical about the level compatibility with 
international treaties and relevant EU directives. Despite progress towards strengthening alignment, 
Turkey has not yet joined the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, while the official publication of the ratified adoption of the Rome and Bern agreements 
remains pending.
32 Further, in the area of industrial property rights, the Commission stresses that 
Turkish law on the legal protection of designs remains incompatible with EU directives.  
The foregoing analysis suggests that despite the positive words from international commentators, 
Turkey has yet to establish a fully secure environment for international investors in the area of IPRs. A 
number of positive steps have been taken on the legislative, institutional and monitoring fronts. In 
particular, Turkey strengthened its regime of IPR-enforcement with the enactment of two pieces of 
legislation in 2004.
33 But problems remain in compatibility with major international agreements and 
EU directives in the area. It is against this background that foreign investment flows into Turkey 
remain significantly weak (Table 9). While macroeconomic instability has played an important role in 
limiting appetite for foreign investments in the country, the institutional environment is also a key 
contributor. Indeed, one would expect that from 1995 onwards, foreign investment inflows would have 
increased into Turkey. Yet the weak institutional framework combined with the financial turbulence at 
the end of the decade has led to a steady deterioration of FDI flows.  
Table 9. Foreign direct investment ($ millions) 
Years Manufacturing  Agriculture Mining  Services  Total 
1994 1107.29  28.27  6.2  335.85  1477.61 
1995 1996.48  31.74  60.62  849.48  2938.32 
1996   640.59  64.1  8.54  3123.74  3836.97 
1997 871.81  12.22  26.7  767.47  1678.2 
1998 1018.29  5.75  13.73  609.67  1647.44 
1999  1123.22  17.19 6.76  553.4 1700.57 
Source: Turkish Treasury Statistics (2001). 
Finally a peculiarity of the customs union should also be recalled. Although the customs union reflects 
a desire for harmonising Turkey’s legislation with that of the Community, the area of IPRs provide an 
interesting exception. According to Art. 10(2) of Annex No. 8, unlike the prevailing regime within the 
Single Market, the exhaustion principle is not applied to trade between Turkey and the EU. In practice, 
this means that parallel imports into Turkey can still be prevented by the owners of intellectual, 
industrial or commercial property rights. This situation is detrimental to the establishment of genuine 
competition in the domestic market and also helps to sustain higher mark-ups for producers with a 
negative impact on consumer surplus. Hence the principle of the exhaustion of IPRs, which has been 
in existence in the EU for more than a decade, should also be applied to the EU-Turkish trade. 
To conclude, our analysis suggests the following policy recommendations in the area of intellectual 
property rights: 
•  Turkey should further strengthen its efforts in the fight against piracy. The establishment of 
enforcement committees at a provincial level has been a positive development, but administrative 
capacity should be strengthened. All international assessments (including the Commission’s 
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annual report in 2003) point towards increasing human capacity (e.g. training) and promoting 
cooperation among the authorities involved. 
•  On the legislative side, efforts should concentrate on achieving full alignment with EU directives. 
Problems remain with regard to Turkey’s accession to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and a number 
of incompatibilities persist in the area of industrial property rights. 
•  The principle of the exhaustion of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights in 
Turkish-EU trade should be introduced. The prevailing regime, based on the non-exhaustion of 
these rights, is an anomaly and is not compatible with the Single Market. 
4.  Widening the customs union 
4.1 Services 
The incorporation of services is the next step in the widening of the customs union. It is also one step 
that is likely to have a significant impact on the Turkish economy given that services represent 
approximately 60% of the national economy.  
Table 10 highlights the absolute and also the relative importance of the services sector in the Turkish 
economy. Whereas the average of total exports as expressed as a percentage of total exports of goods 
is 1.34% for the EU-15 and the EU-27, the same ratio for Turkey is 1.37%.  
Table 10. Export composition 
 Year  Goods Exports  Services (Goods  +  Services)/Goods
    ($ millions) ($ millions) (%)
EU-15 –  1,412,198 487,024 1.34
Cyprus 2001  977 3,353 4.43
Czech Republic  2001 33,404 7,092 1.21
Estonia 2001  3,338 1,643 1.49
Hungary 2002  34,792 7,807 1.22
Latvia 2002  2,576 1,252 1.49
Lithuania 2002  6,028 1,464 1.24
Malta 2002  2,150 1,096 1.51
Poland 2001  41,664 9,755 1.23
Slovak Republic  2000  11,896 2,241 1.19
Slovenia 2002  10,473 2,292 1.22
Bulgaria 2002  5,688 2,594 1.46
Romania 2002  13,869 2,332 1.17
Turkey 2002  39,827 14,781 1.37
EU-27 –  1,579,053 529,944 1.34
EU-28 –  1,618,880 571,725 1.35
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF, 2003. 
In addition, the liberalisation of trade in services also presents a set of special challenges owing to the 
nature of the topic. Before addressing the impact and challenges posed by this additional step towards 
more complete trade integration, it is worth recalling the present state of affairs. 
4.1.1 Trade in services between Turkey and the EU: Overview 
The Ankara Association Agreement of 1963, which represents the first contractual agreement between 
the two sides, was modelled after the Rome Treaty. As such, it called for the establishment of a 
common market between Turkey and the EEC. As a result, the liberalisation of trade in services was to 
be accomplished in parallel with the liberalisation of trade in goods, along with the free circulation of 24 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
capital and labour. The Additional Protocol of 1973, which set out a detailed timetable as regards the 
completion of the customs union, also mentioned the objective of achieving the other three 
fundamental freedoms. In fact, Arts. 13 and 14 of the Ankara Agreement, as well as Art. 41(2) of the 
Additional Protocol foresaw, by decision of the Association Council, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment, using the relevant 
provisions of the EC Treaty as guidelines. Yet the efforts for economic integration were suspended in 
1974. They were resumed in 1987 but focused on the liberalisation of trade in goods (or in other words 
the completion of the customs union). Indeed, the customs union was finally completed on the 31st of 
December 1995.  
In parallel with the negotiations that were undertaken to complete the customs union, a set of 
exploratory talks with a view towards simultaneously reaching an agreement to liberalise trade in 
services were initiated in 1993 and were carried on in 1994. As a result, a set of provisions regarding 
trade in services were incorporated in the initial draft of the customs union decision. It appeared soon 
after that member states were not ready to accept the initial formulation. The main fear was that the 
liberalisation of trade in services between Turkey and the EU would necessarily entail some degree of 
liberalisation as regards the right of establishment of service providers. Hence there were fears that 
this could provide the opportunity for many Turkish service providers to immigrate to EU countries. 
Apparently the EU wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation that led to the so-called ‘Rush 
Portugesa’  judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), where it ruled that a Portuguese 
company providing construction services in France could use its own Portuguese workforce for that 
purpose despite the fact that the movement of workers had not yet been liberalised between the EU 
and Portugal. Faced with such political difficulties, the Commission and the Turkish side agreed to a 
more restrictive version of the initial text. Nevertheless, the EU’s position hardened even more and 
eventually it resisted any attempt to incorporate provisions related to the liberalisation of trade in 
services in the customs union decision. It should be underlined at this point that the Turkish side had 
wanted to include services in the eventual agreement. It was the Community side (the Council rather 
than the Commission) that prevented this objective from being fulfilled. Eventually, the goal of 
achieving free trade in services was mentioned not in the Association Council Decision of January 
1995 on the completion of the customs union but as one of the items of the Resolution that the 
Association Council adopted on the same day. 
The dynamics for having a free trade agreement in services were rekindled following the December 
1999 Helsinki EU summit where Turkey was granted candidate status. The negotiations on trade in 
services resumed thereafter. The parties have now completed several rounds of negotiations and a 
basic text targeting the full liberalisation of trade in services is expected to be agreed upon before the 
end of 2004. Thus Turkey and the EU will embark upon the next journey in their economic 
integration. As in the case of the customs union (and unlike many other candidate countries), 
liberalisation of trade in services will be completed before Turkey’s full membership.  
It is therefore worth examining not only the economic impact of this endeavour but also the particular 
challenges posed by this unique level of integration. 
4.1.2 Political and institutional aspects 
The services area brings to the fore a host of problems that do not exist for the manufacturing trade. 
There are essentially two different models that can be adopted for that purpose. The first model is the 
approach of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). GATS provides a framework 
for the multilateral liberalisation of trade in services. It rests on the commitment of the contracting 
parties for market access and for national treatment. In their schedule of specific commitments, 
contracting parties specify the limitations with regard to market access and limitations concerning 
national treatment for the four different modes of supply of services identified by GATS, which are 
cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence in the consuming country and the presence of 
naturalised persons. As such, GATS provides a somewhat complicated framework that essentially THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 25 
 
aims at transposing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework onto the services 
sector. 
In contrast, the EU takes a different route to the trade of services. The EU approach rests on the ‘deep 
integration’ model, which in addition to the pure liberalisation of trade in services also aims at policy 
convergence. In other words, in the EU model, the trading partner is called upon to adopt the EU 
acquis in the services area in addition to eliminating the barriers to services trade. This is seen as an 
indispensable condition for being part of the European Single Market. The liberalisation of the 
services trade is to go in parallel with policy harmonisation. 
It may be contended that the EU approach is more rigorous and more ambitious. But at the same time, 
the requirement of policy convergence makes the EU approach a more difficult model to adopt for the 
trading partner for whom full membership – which would have necessitated full policy harmonisation 
in any case – is not imminent or not foreseen. The flaw in this arrangement is a political one. The 
trading partner is called upon to adopt a body of legislation that was prepared and developed by a third 
party, i.e. EU member states. Furthermore, once the free trade agreement is in place, the trading 
partner will be asked to follow the changes made in the EU legislation and incorporate these in its 
national legislation. In other words, the trading partner will have lost its ability to follow an 
independent policy in all the other areas covered by the free trade agreement. Given that the agreement 
is set to cover a substantial part of the services economy, including such sectors as the financial sector, 
telecommunications, transport and energy, the loss of independence in policy-making is indeed 
significant. The challenge is one of creating a model that will minimise the detrimental impact of this 
policy dependence. It may be claimed that creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1993 – 
which basically incorporated former European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries within the 
European internal market but at the expense of eroding their policy independence in many areas – was 
instrumental in accelerating some of the former EFTA members’ (Sweden, Finland and Austria) 
decision to join the EU. This occurred even though the EU and EFTA created a detailed arrangement 
for joint decision-shaping if not decision-making. As such, EFTA representatives were allowed to 
participate in the work of the EU’s many technical committees where new legislation was being 
discussed. In addition, the EEA agreement contains a detailed procedure for consultations between the 
parties on legislation related to the areas covered by the agreement. Finally, it should also be pointed 
out that these provisions for institutional cooperation were put into practice unlike the provisions of 
institutional cooperation that were agreed upon for the Turkish-EU customs union.  
It is therefore imperative that due attention is devoted to the question of institutional cooperation for 
an agreement on the liberalisation of trade in services between the EU and a third party to function 
effectively. The focus must be on achieving a genuine, joint decision-shaping ability. Such 
consideration is important not only in the case of Turkey, since free trade in services is likely to 
precede full membership but also for the Wider Europe initiative where trading partners will not be 
offered the prospect of full membership in the foreseeable future (if ever). Failure to achieve genuine, 
joint decision-shaping will open agreements based on policy integration to political criticism on the 
side of the trading partner – so much so that it may jeopardise the political attractiveness and the 
acceptability of the whole deal.  
4.1.3 Impact 
The liberalisation of trade in services between Turkey and the EU will certainly have a much more 
pronounced impact on the Turkish economy than on the EU economy. Notwithstanding sectoral 
differences, the Turkish economy in general stands to benefit from this liberalisation for two reasons. 
First, such a deal would allow genuine competition to emerge in many sectors of the economy. It is a 
well-known fact that Turkey’s competitiveness is negatively affected by lack of competition and poor 
productivity in the services sector. The low level of productivity in this area stems from the direct 
involvement of the state as an economic agent in service industries. Telecommunications, energy and 
air transport are all cases in point. This economic structure leads to a lacklustre performance of the 
service sector, which in turn raises the cost of all industries given that these are indispensable inputs 26 | ÜLGEN & ZAHARIADIS 
 
for the economy as a whole. Therefore the liberalisation of trade in services and the accompanying de-
regulation is set to radically change the performance of the service economy in Turkey. As a result, the 
service sector should be expected to grow faster than in the past and create a larger proportion of the 
added value in Turkey. By the same token, the benefits of a more productive and a more competitive 
service sector would also accrue to the manufacturing industry, which would then see its international 
competitiveness enhanced by being able to significantly reduce its cost structure. 
Second, the policy integration aspect of trade liberalisation in services will ensure the improvement of 
governance of the economy. Good governance is of critical importance in the long-term performance 
of the economy. The regulatory framework established by the relevant EU acquis and especially the 
independent regulatory institutions, which are or shall be set up for that purpose, will be instrumental 
in achieving an improved governance of the economy. It may be of interest to conjecture that had 
services been incorporated in the customs union decision of 1995 and the regulatory framework been 
established in line with EU practice, the severe banking and then the financial and economic crises the 
country underwent in 2000 and 2001 would probably not have happened. The answer to this 
hypothetical question would need to take into consideration the fact that the poor regulatory oversight 
of the banking industry and the ensuing losses of many privately held banks had a major role in 
igniting the crises and in increasing the costs of dealing with them. In short, it can be claimed that the 
liberalisation of trade in services and the accompanying regulatory policy convergence with the EU 
will lead to an enhanced governance of the economy and better prospects for a less fragile, less 
volatile economy set on a path of sustainable growth. 
4.1.4 Policy recommendations 
The parties are currently negotiating the agreement to liberalise trade in services between them. The 
current text foresees a gradual liberalisation over a ten-year period. Some services will be opened to 
competition before others. The transition towards full liberalisation will depend on Turkey’s adoption 
of the relevant acquis. The question of sequencing, namely how to determine different transition 
periods for different segments of the service sector, therefore becomes of interest. The most 
economically sound rule would be to prioritise business services such as financial services, 
telecommunications and to some extent energy and allow liberalisation to proceed sooner in these 
areas so that the productivity and competitiveness gains mentioned in the previous section would be 
achieved sooner rather than later. In addition, the impact of this form of trade integration on good 
governance of the economy would also be ensured in the areas where it matters most.  
Contracting services may also be included in the fields of activity to be liberalised in the short term. 
This is an area where Turkey feels it has the most to gain given its strong, internationally competitive 
and experienced construction industry. As such, it is also a crucial area that would make the whole 
services deal more palatable, as well as politically more feasible and sellable to the Turkish public.  
The mutual liberalisation of contracting services would, however, imply more flexible rules for the 
temporary establishment of Turkish construction workers in EU countries. As such, it would require a 
‘leap of faith’ from the EU member states, which have been quite adamant in the past about 
liberalising these rules. 
A related issue in this respect is the whole question of the temporary movement of service providers. 
The services deal would need to address this question appropriately, given that in some service 
activities, this forms one of the sine qua nons for the supply of the service. Both Turkey and the EU 
would in this instance need to move beyond the current GATS framework, which is more restrictive in 
nature. There could, however, be references to GATS definitions on questions such as the 
determination of ‘key personnel’, which could be considered as advantageous with regard to the 
freedom of establishment. Furthermore, the Community’s visa regime with regard to Turkish service 
providers would also need to be amended so as to give essence to these freedoms. 
The Community’s approach to the issue of the temporary movement of workers linked to the freedom 
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certain member states. As such, the EU offer in the ongoing negotiations parallels the GATS 
framework, which refers almost exclusively to higher-level personnel, especially to intra-corporate 
transferees. Indeed in its GATS commitments, the EU limits the supply of services through the 
presence of naturalised persons to those employed by a legal citizen and belonging to the following 
categories: senior management, specialists possessing ‘uncommon knowledge’ and occasional 
business visitors. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay round, this was expanded for periods of up 
to three months to naturalised persons employed by a legal citizen who has no commercial presence in 
the EU and upon the condition that the naturalised person supplies a service for which his or her 
employer has obtained a contract in the EU. Yet this only applies to knowledge-intensive sectors such 
as legal, architectural or engineering services. Finally, there are no commitments with regard to the 
supply of services by self-employed naturalised persons. The EU’s GATS concessions would have 
limited significance for Turkey since its comparative advantage lies in low- and medium-skilled 
labour-intensive services such as construction services. 
If Turkey is to be integrated in the European Single Market, the question of the temporary movement 
of workers must be addressed within a more appropriate framework. A failure to set up this framework 
would result in a failure to derive the expected benefits from a services agreement. There are many 
constraints on the movement of naturalised persons, most of which stem from the fact that there is no 
separation between temporary and permanent labour movement. At present, the temporary movement 
of labour comes under the purview of EU immigration legislation and labour market policy rather than 
that of international trade. It should be possible to establish a predictable, harmonised and transparent 
system with the overall objective of allowing the necessary mobility of service providers on a 
temporary basis without compromising immigration policy.  
More than the EEA model, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may provide a 
reference framework for that purpose. As outlined by Winters et al.,
34 there are various categories of 
temporary entry for business persons among the NAFTA member states: business visitors, traders and 
investors, intra-company transferees and professionals. The basic principles for the temporary entry 
for businesspersons in NAFTA are transparent criteria and procedures, reciprocity and recognition of 
the preferential trading relationship. There are no conditions – such as labour certification tests, prior 
approval procedures, petition, or other procedures of similar effect – and with one broad exception 
related to professional services there are no numerical quota restrictions. 
The definition of a ‘business visitor’ is a citizen of a party who is engaged in the trade of goods, the 
provision of services or the conduct of investment activities. ‘Temporary’ is defined as having no 
intent to establish permanent residence. NAFTA grants temporary entry visas to business visitors 
seeking to engage in a business activity without requiring that person to obtain an employment 
authorisation from the host country. Visitors must ensure that their primary source of remuneration for 
the proposed business activity is their home country, not the territory of the party granting temporary 
entry; their principal place of business and actual place of accrual of profits must, at least 
predominantly, remain outside such territory. Instead of defining what kind of persons or professions 
may move, the NAFTA agreement defines the business activities in which such persons engage. 
Business activities include: research and design; growth, manufacture and production; agriculture 
(harvester-owner supervising a harvesting crew admitted under the applicable law); marketing (market 
researchers and analysts conducting research); sales, distribution, after-sales services and general 
service including tourism. Under the category of sales, for example, Mexican sales representatives and 
agents are allowed to enter Canada to take orders or negotiate contracts for goods or services for the 
Mexican firm. They are not, however, allowed to deliver goods or provide services to the public in 
Canada. Relatively low-skilled workers, such as transportation operators (tour-bus operators) are 
allowed move across countries to provide services under the auspices of their domestic companies. 
                                                 
34 See A. Winters, Terrie L. Walmsley, Zhen Kun Wang and Roman Grynberg (2002), Negotiating the 
Liberalisation of the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons, Discussion Paper 87, University of Sussex, 
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The second NAFTA category under the temporary entry of businesspersons is for traders and 
investors. Traders, who carry on substantial trade in goods and services between member states are 
granted temporary entry. Investors are those who are seeking to establish, develop, administer or 
provide advice or key technical services to the operation of an investment. The investment does not 
have to be owned by the person who is seeking the temporary entry nor does it have to be committed, 
but can rather be in the process of commitment. The agreement indicates that the investment should 
involve a ‘substantial’ amount of capital, but without spelling out how much this would be. 
Under the category of intra-company transferees, the person involved must have been employed 
continuously by the enterprise for one year in the previous three-year period. He/she must work in the 
capacity of manager or executive, or be the repository of special knowledge. As with all the other 
categories, there are no numerical quotas imposed on the intra-companies transferees between NAFTA 
members. 
Under the category of professionals, NAFTA encourages the mutual recognition of accreditation, 
licensing and certification requirements. A person seeking to engage in a business activity at a 
competent level in a profession is permitted temporary entry. Unlike the other categories, however, 
this category allows the US to impose annual numerical limits on Mexico. Initially, the US approved 
up to 5,500 professional Mexicans per annum seeking temporary entry to the US; NAFTA requires 
that the US should, in consultation with Mexico, increase its annual quota each year. The US and 
Mexico agreed that the US would phase out the annual quotas if it grants a better treatment to a third 
party (a most-favoured nation clause) or ten years after signing the agreement, whichever is sooner. In 
defining ‘professionals’, most require a university degree or equivalent qualification. 
To conclude, the parties must show the political willingness to go beyond the rather restrictive 
framework of GATS. A more imaginative model is definitely needed. Some elements of this 
framework could incorporate the following: 
•  the introduction of a special, multi-entry ‘services’ visa; 
•  the establishment of a transparent and responsive system for the granting of services visas; 
•  wider coverage of service personnel categories so as to include middle- and lower-skilled workers 
and professionals; 
•  acceleration of the mutual recognition of qualifications; and 
•  possibly the separation of social security contributions into short-term (work-related accident and 
health) and long-term (pension) social protection. 
The institutional capacity of existing and recently established regulatory institutions such as the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority or even the 
Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Board would be instrumental in ensuring the proper functioning 
of the services agreement by providing effective regulatory oversight of the whole service sector. As 
such, it would be of interest to launch specific programmes to strengthen the institutional capacity of 
such institutions and to enhance their knowledge of the related EU acquis and practice.  
It should be recalled that the Turkish Competition Authority, which will also have a significant role in 
Turkey’s adoption and implementation of those aspects of the EU acquis that are pertinent to the 
service sector, has a fine record of upholding competition rules in Turkey. It has been lauded in the 
past by the European Commission for its effective role in this regard. It should therefore be pointed 
out that the existence of such an important and well-established regulatory authority in Turkey would 
definitely be a major advantage during the transition process to the full freedom to provide cross-
border services. The one area where the Competition Authority has had no competence and therefore 
no experience has been the area of state aid. At the time of writing, Turkey had still not fulfilled its 
obligations stemming from the customs union decision to set up an independent regulatory body to 
monitor state aid in Turkey. There is a draft law prepared for this purpose. It would thus be of 
significant importance to initiate a cooperation programme between the Commission and the soon-to-
be-established Turkish state aid monitoring authority, with a view to the effective implementation of THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-EU TRADE RELATIONS | 29 
 
state aid rules in Turkey. This is even more important for some service sectors where the state remains 
a major player (banking), a dominant player (telecommunications and air transport) or even a 
monopolist (electricity and natural gas transport along with rail transport).  
It should also be recalled that in addition to an agreement to liberalise trade in services, the parties are 
also negotiating an agreement for the mutual liberalisation of public procurement markets. The 
negotiations are carried out as a package deal where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. 
Therefore the completion of the services negotiations will depend on exogenous factors, such as the 
success of a deal involving the opening up of the public procurement markets. 
To conclude, the recommendations of our working group with regard to the liberalisation of trade in 
services between Turkey and the EU are as follows: 
•  The liberalisation of trade in services between Turkey and the EU should be accomplished before 
Turkey’s full membership. 
•  A model of institutional cooperation should be developed, which would allow decision-shaping in 
policy areas covered by the agreement. The EEA model can be a reference point in that respect. 
•  The sequencing of the fields of activity that are to be liberalised should occur in accordance with 
the importance of backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy that the specific 
service sector provides. As such, priority should be given to business services.  
•  Contracting services should also be included among the short-term priorities for liberalisation, 
given its importance for the Turkish economy.  
•  This measure would necessitate more flexible rules for the temporary movement of Turkish 
workers. 
•  A related issue is the amendment of the EU’s visa regime with regard to the temporary movement 
of key Turkish personnel.  
•  A specific assistance programme to enhance the institutional capacity of Turkish regulatory 
authorities should be implemented.  
•  A cooperation programme between the Commission and the Turkish Competition Authority with a 
view to the effective implementation of state-aid rules in Turkey should also be envisaged. 
5. Conclusion 
A customs union is an intrinsically complex arrangement to carry out. It creates a policy-dependency 
framework that is difficult to manage between two sovereign entities of a totally different size. Turkey 
and the EU ended up in a customs-union setting essentially as a result of a legacy issue. The customs 
union was the model of trade integration that was adopted by the EEC internally and initially 
externally as illustrated by its earliest association agreements with Greece
35 and Turkey. In fact, most 
of the problems identified in the Turkish-EU customs union stem from this factor. A second set of 
problems derive from ‘hidden protectionism’. The EU’s complaints with regard to the functioning of 
the customs union are indeed related to this type of protectionism, characterised by the non-tariff 
barriers to trade that are still witnessed on the Turkish side. Yet, notwithstanding this range of 
problems, the Turkish-EU customs union must be defined as a technical success. Since its 
establishment, the customs union has been able to function on a sound basis. 
It may appear at first sight disappointing that the customs union has not had a major impact on the 
direction of trade. But this is understandable given that the EU had already liberalised its trade with 
Turkey (except in the area of textiles) well before the customs union entered into force and thus the 
EU had already become the most important trading partner of Turkey. The customs union did not 
                                                 
35 Like Turkey, Greece applied for an Association Agreement with the Community in the late 1950s. The 
agreement envisaged the establishment of a customs union (as in the case of Turkey), but it took the form of full 
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change this, yet it was instrumental in the growth of the volume of trade between the partners and the 
growth of overall trade of Turkey. In light of the growth in trade volume and a lack of significant 
change in trade direction, it can be concluded that the Turkish-EU customs union has been a welfare-
creating one, leading to more trade creation than trade diversion. 
There are, however, a number of issues that remain regarding the future of trade integration between 
the two parties. These issues can be summarised under two headings: the deepening of the customs 
union and the widening of the customs union. With respect to the deepening of the customs union, we 
believe that the EU must undertake a significant effort to alleviate the concerns of the Turkish side in 
terms of the policy dependency framework, particularly in relation to the development of a genuinely 
common commercial policy. As for Turkey, the most important aspect related to the current 
functioning of the customs union would be to eliminate the hidden forms of protectionism, especially 
in the area of technical barriers to trade. Finally, both parties should focus on the elimination of trade 
defence instruments vis-à-vis each other and should define the conditions related to the abolition of 
these instruments in clearer terms.  
In relation to the widening of the customs union, an agreement on the liberalisation of trade in services 
and the incorporation of the agricultural sector
36 within the customs union is to be expected. The 
liberalisation of trade in services will thus be the next ‘new thing’ in the Turkish-EU trade integration 
path. This development is bound to have a significant impact on the Turkish economy given the high 
share of services. Yet both the EU and Turkey must start to address this issue in more imaginative 
ways so as to bring workable, adaptable and flexible solutions to the core problems of policy 
dependency, institutional cooperation and the question of the freedom of establishment.  
Finally, given the experience of the customs union, this new step in trade integration needs to be 
coupled with a more effective communications strategy. The customs union became a scapegoat for 
many ills of the Turkish economy as well as a rallying point for all the anti-globalisation and anti-
liberalisation circles. As a result, the public image of the customs union in Turkey has been severely 
tarnished and remains as such. The more ambitious project of economic integration involving services 
and agriculture should not go down the same path. It is imperative that this time around trade 
integration is accompanied by a pertinent communications campaign that would aim at explaining to 
the public at large the reasons, the possible impact and the expected gains from this endeavour of 
economic integration. 
Achieving these goals would help the parties to undertake a more comprehensive framework of trade 
integration with less friction and more welfare creation. 
                                                 
36 The impact of the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products is being analysed in a separate working paper. | 31 
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